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X. PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Plaintiff-Appellant Enron Oil & Gas Company ("Enron") respectfully 
petitions this Court for rehearing in this case. As grounds for 
this petition, Enron respectfully states that the majority 
interprets the provisions of Enron's gas purchase agreements in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the prior decision reached by the 
Utah Court of Appeals on the same issue, and that the majority 
otherwise sets forth a rule for royalty valuation of natural gas 
which is inconsistent with virtually every other jurisdiction that 
has addressed this issue, creating a significant departure from 
established oil and gas law. This petition is presented in good 
faith and not for delay. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The issues brought to the Court for its consideration in this 
petition are as follows: 
A. In reviewing Enron's gas purchase agreements, pursuant to 
which its natural gas production was sold and the ad valorem tax 
reimbursements in dispute were paid, the Court found that tax 
reimbursements were part of the price paid for the delivery of 
natural gas. This ruling is inconsistent with the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in BelNorth Petroleum Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n. 845 P.2d 266 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1993), and rulings of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
1 
Commission, The majority has also failed to consider all of the 
provisions of Enron's gas purchase agreements. 
B. The majority decision states that ad valorem tax 
reimbursements must be included in the value of natural gas for 
royalty purposes because the lease provisions state that the price 
for which production is sold cannot be less than that for which 
production from United States oil and gas leases is sold. The 
majority has confused price with royalty, creating practical 
consequences which the Court should review. 
C. The majority has misconstrued Enron's arguments 
concerning the tax free nature of the royalty share of production. 
The majority has found that the market value of natural gas 
production for royalty purposes is determined without regard to the 
legal characteristics of the royalty gas produced. The rule of law 
in virtually every other jurisdiction is to the contrary, that gas 
possessing different legal characteristics must be valued based 
upon its legal as well as physical attributes. In this respect, 
the majority's decision creates substantial inconsistency with 
existing oil and gas law, and in fact represents a departure from 
established legal principles. 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND RELEVANT FACTS 
Enron owns oil and gas leases which are committed to the terms 
and provisions of the Chapita Wells and the Natural Buttes federal 
units in Uintah County, Utah, fifty-two (52) of which were issued 
by the State of Utah, Division of State Lands and Forestry 
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("Division"). Enron's oil and gas leases all contain the following 
provisions relative to payment of royalty: 
Gas - Lessee also agrees to pay Lessor twelve and one-
half percent (12-1/2%) of the reasonable market value at 
the well of all gas produced and saved or sold from the 
leased premises. Where gas is sold under a contract, and 
such contract has been approved in whole or conditionally 
by the Lessor, the reasonable market value of such gas 
for the purpose of determining royalties payable 
hereunder shall be the price at which production is sold, 
provided that in no event shall the price for gas be less 
than that received by the United States of America for 
its royalties from gas of like grade and quality from the 
same field. 
See Brief of Appellant Enron Oil & Gas Company at 6-7, Addendum C 
at § 4(b). 
Enron sold its natural gas in the Chapita Wells Unit to 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company under an agreement dated January 22, 
1982 ("Mountain Fuel Agreement") . Enron sold its gas produced from 
the Natural Buttes Unit to Colorado Interstate Gas Company pursuant 
to agreement dated June 20, 1974 ("CIG Agreement"). Each of these 
agreements provided that the price paid to Enron would be the 
highest permitted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
("FERC") and that the purchaser would reimburse Enron for all ad 
valorem and severance taxes paid by Enron. 
Enron paid ad valorem and severance taxes associated with its 
natural gas production from the Chapita Wells and Natural Buttes 
Units which were reimbursed to Enron by Mountain Fuel or CIG 
pursuant to their respective gas purchase agreements. However, 
natural gas production attributable to the Division was exempt from 
taxation. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101 (1953 as amended); Utah 
Const, art. XIII, § 2. 
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Enron paid royalty on its natural gas production to the 
Division based upon the price paid to it for the natural gas 
delivered under the CIG and Mountain Fuel Agreements, being the 
highest price allowed under federal law. Enron did not pay royalty 
based upon the value of ad valorem tax reimbursements received from 
its gas purchasers. 
The Utah State Tax Commission determined that Enron had 
improperly paid royalty to the Division in that Enron had not paid 
royalty on ad valorem tax reimbursements received by Enron from its 
gas purchasers. On February 23, 1987, the Division advised Enron 
that a deficiency of $91,000.19 in royalty payments was due. On 
May 29, 1987, Enron submitted a request for redetermination which 
was denied by correspondence dated July 14, 1987. 
On February 22, 1988, Enron filed its Petition for Review of 
Agency Action and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Further 
Relief with the Utah District Court, Third Judicial District. By 
its Order for Summary Judgment dated January 17, 1990 (sic), the 
District Court ruled that the Division was entitled to collect 
royalty on ad valorem tax reimbursements. 
Enron timely appealed the District Courtfs decision to this 
Court. By Decision dated January 5, 1994, a majority of this 
Court, by a three to two vote, upheld the decision of the District 
Court. A true and correct copy of the Utah Supreme Court's "green 
sheet" opinion is attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Ad Valorem Tax Reimbursements Are Not Part of the Price 
Paid for Natural Gas Under the Provisions of Enron's 
Natural Gas Purchase Agreements. 
1. The decision of the Court is inconsistent with 
prior decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Under the terms of the royalty clause contained in Enronfs 
leases, royalty is to be paid to the Division based upon market 
value and, "the price at which production is sold." In its 
opinion, the majority determined that the price for which 
production is sold included tax reimbursements. The majority 
opinion states: 
Enron concedes that the market value of gas is the 
highest price that a willing buyer would agree to pay a 
willing seller. The stated price is not, however, the 
sole measure of market value in this case. Severance 
taxes are a cost of production for the producer. 
Shifting that cost to the buyer by a tax reimbursement is 
simply additional consideration to the seller. In short, 
the stated price plus tax reimbursements constitute the 
consideration that a willing buyer pays a willing seller 
and together they equal the "reasonable market value" of 
the gas. 
Opinion at 5 (emphasis by the Court). However, this very point was 
before the Utah Court of Appeals in the case of BelNorth Petroleum 
Corp. v. Utah, which involved the same production and gas purchase 
contracts as are involved in this case. See 845 P. 2d 266. The 
issue before that court was whether or not ad valorem tax 
reimbursements were subject to occupation and conservation taxes 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-67 (codified as amended at Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-5-103 (1992)). The applicable statutory provisions 
require that occupation and conservation taxes be based upon the 
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"value at the well11 of the gas produced. The Court of Appeals held 
that tax reimbursements were not part of the value of natural gas 
at the well for occupation and conservation taxes. The Utah 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 859 P.2d 585 (1993). 
The majority opinion of this Court is wholly inconsistent with 
the logic and ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in BelNorth 
Petroleum Corp.. For that reason, the language of the Court of 
Appeals decision is quoted at length: 
The tax reimbursements clearly did not compensate 
Enron for its production of the gas itself. It is 
undisputed that natural gas sellers and purchasers enter 
into reimbursement agreements in order to determine who 
will bear the costs of ad valorem taxes, and the risk of 
future increases, during the life of the contract. 
Sellers are reluctant to commit to a set price over an 
extended period of time where future tax increases might 
erode profits. Consequently, purchasers typically agree 
to reimburse the seller its ad valorem taxes, in whole or 
in part, in order to obtain a set price over an extended 
period of time. In other words, the tax reimbursements 
are given to Enron in return for contractual rights with 
their own independent value. It therefore follows that 
any consideration Enron receives in return for its 
promise of future performance is not consideration given 
for the gas itself.... 
The fact that a natural gas purchaser is willing to 
absorb the ad valorem tax liability of the seller in 
addition to the value it pays for the gas itself, does 
not increase the value of the gas. The "market value" of 
an item is typically defined as the amount a willing 
buyer will pay a willing seller. It is not the amount a 
willing buyer would pay a willing seller, plus tax. 
BelNorth Petroleum Corp., 845 P.2d at 270 (emphasis by the court). 
Thus, the majority opinion creates a clear inconsistency with 
the established Utah law as to the nature of tax reimbursements 
paid by natural gas purchasers. The issue is significant not only 
for tax and royalty valuation purposes, but also relates to royalty 
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payments to private owners, and to public utility regulation, and 
is relevant as a statement of Utah law which could be applied in 
many federal contexts. This Court should grant rehearing in order 
to clearly delineate the nature of tax reimbursements under Utah 
law. This Court should ratify the reasoning of the Utah Court of 
Appeals in BelNorth Petroleum Corp.. to the effect that ad valorem 
tax reimbursements are not part of the price paid for production 
and are not relevant to its market value, and are not royalty 
bearing. 
2. The majority has failed to consider all of the 
provisions of Enron's gas purchase agreements. 
The majority opinion is based in significant part upon the 
provisions of Enron's gas purchase agreements. In reviewing these 
agreements, the majority has overlooked relevant portions of these 
contracts, which are now drawn to the Court's attention. 
Specifically, the majority relies in significant part upon the 
provisions of the Mountain Fuel Agreement: 
The "reasonable market value" or "price at which 
production is sold" under Enron's lease is explicitly 
stated in the Mountain Fuel contract: "The total price 
for regulated gas shall consist of the base price...and 
tax reimbursements." 
Opinion at 5 (quoting Mountain Fuel Agreement art. XVII-l(a)). 
The majority failed, however, to consider the provisions in 
the same paragraph of the Mountain Fuel Agreement, pertaining to 
unregulated gas. They provide for a negotiated price, and in the 
event that an agreement cannot be reached, a specified price. 
Neither the negotiated price nor the fixed price include tax 
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reimbursements which remain in effect as to both regulated and 
unregulated gas pursuant to different provisions of the agreement. 
See Brief of Appellant Enron Oil & Gas Company, Addendum D at art. 
VII-3. 
3. Tax reimbursements are not part of the maximum 
lawful price specified by FERC. 
In interpreting the Mountain Fuel and CIG Agreements, the 
majority states: 
The ]anguage in the CIG gas purchase contract is not as 
clear with respect to specifying consideration to be paid 
to Enron, but it is nevertheless clear that the total 
consideration is the stated price plus the tax 
reimbursement. That agreement refers to the "highest 
price allowed by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission." 
Opinion at 5. 
However, the majority has failed to address the language found 
in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 ("NGPA") concerning tax 
reimbursements, 30 U.S.C. § 3320 (1990), which specifically states 
that the maximum lawful price allowed shall not be exceeded, "if 
such first sale price exceeds the maximum lawful price to the 
extent necessary to recover..." state production taxes. Clearly, 
the NGPA distinguishes between tax reimbursements and the price 
paid for natural gas, or the "maximum price allowed." The majority 
has also failed to consider that FERC has determined that tax 
reimbursements are not part of the price paid for the delivery of 
natural gas. In fact, FERC has specifically rejected the notion 
that maximum lawful price includes tax reimbursements. See 
Regulations Preamble, 48 Fed. Reg. 48,223 (Oct. 18, 1983). 
Because of the inconsistency between the majority opinion and 
FERC rulings on the definition of maximum lawful price, natural gas 
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producers and buyers are in an uncertain position as to the proper 
treatment of ad valorem tax reimbursements for royalty, regulatory 
and administrative purposes. Again, the Court should grant 
rehearing and articulate a rule of law that ad valorem tax 
reimbursements are not included within the price paid for the 
delivery of natural gas, and are not royalty bearing. 
B. The Court's Opinion Expands the Lease Provisions 
Requiring That the Value of Natural Gas for Royalty 
Purposes Shall Not Be less than That Established for 
United States Oil and Gas Leases. 
The majority also relies upon the provisions of Enron's oil 
and gas leases to the effect that the price of natural gas for 
royalty purposes cannot be less than that established for royalty 
on United States oil and gas leases for gas of like quality. In 
effect, the majority has ruled that the royalty paid under the 
Division's leases must equal the royalty paid to the Department of 
Interior on its leases. This incorrect construction of the lease 
language has results which may not have been anticipated by the 
majority. 
First, the Court will again note the language contained in the 
royalty clause in Enron's leases. It defines "market value" in the 
following manner: 
Where gas is sold under a contract, and such contract has 
been approved in whole or conditionally by the lessor, 
the reasonable market value of such gas for the purpose 
of determining royalties payable hereunder shall be the 
price at which production is sold, provided that in no 
event shall the price for gas be less than that received 
by the United States of America for its royalties from 
gas of like grade and quality from the same field. 
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Brief of Appellant Enron Oil & Gas Company Addendum C at § 4(b) 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, it is the price specified in an approved natural gas 
contract that must be at least the price for which production from 
United States oil and gas leases is sold. Here, the record 
reflects that the price for which natural gas was sold from the 
Division's leases was the same as the price received for gas 
allocated to leases issued by the United States of America. It 
represents a strained construction of the lease language to 
construe it to require that the net royalty payment to the Division 
should be at least that paid to the United States. As pointed out 
by the dissent, this provision relates only to the price paid under 
an approved natural gas contract, not to the ultimate royalty paid 
to the Division. 
More significantly for purposes of this petition, the Court's 
ruling may have consequences which may not have been considered by 
the majority. The majority's opinion in effect incorporates by 
reference the entire scheme of royalty valuation established by the 
United States Department of the Interior. The United States 
Department of the Interior maintains a long and changing history of 
royalty valuation issues as illustrated by the fact that a twenty 
volume service has now been published concerning it. See Gower 
Federal Service - Royalty Valuation and Management (Rocky Mountain 
Mineral Law Foundation) . It is respectfully submitted that the 
parties to Enron's oil and gas leases could not have intended to 
adopt this entire royalty valuation scheme. Yet under the 
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majority's opinion, the Division and its lessees must maintain 
constant knowledge of the changing positions of the Department of 
the Interior with respect to royalty issues, and be bound by the 
results of litigation between the Department of the Interior and 
its lessees. As such, the minimum value for royalty purposes upon 
which the Division's royalty is based would be constantly changing 
and dependent upon royalty valuation principles not subject to 
control by the State of Utah. The more appropriate analysis of the 
dissent does not result in these consequences. 
C. The Court's Opinion Misconstrues Enron's Arguments and 
Establishes a Method For Valuing Natural Gas Production 
for Royalty Purposes Which Is Inconsistent with That 
Adopted by Virtually Every Other Jurisdiction. 
Enron has argued that because the share of production 
attributable to the Division's royalty interest is a separate, 
distinct share of production, and is tax free, that tax free 
reimbursements cannot by definition represent part of its value. 
The only mention of this argument in the majority opinion is the 
notion that value of the Division's share of gas, even though tax 
free, should include a tax reimbursement because the value of the 
gas would be the price that the Division would pay on the open 
market. See Opinion at 6. Presumably, the majority intended to 
say that since purchasers pay stated prices plus tax reimbursements 
for the acquisition of natural gas supplies, that the Division 
would also be required to pay tax reimbursements if it acquired gas 
for its own purposes in the open market. 
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The Court must, however, recognize that if the Division were 
to purchase natural gas on the open market as opposed to taking its 
gas in kind, it would of course pay a tax reimbursement to the 
seller only if the gas it bought were subject to tax. If the 
Division bought its own gas even on the open market, it would not 
pay a tax reimbursement. If the Division were to purchase a gas 
stream, to .the extent the gas purchased was produced from state 
leases, the price paid by the Division would not include a tax 
reimbursement. It is simply untrue to state or assume that if the 
Division were to purchase gas on the open market that it would 
necessarily pay a tax reimbursement. 
This confusion perhaps results from the majority's 
inappropriate reliance upon the decision of the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc. v. United States 
Dep't of Interior, 723 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1983) and the prior 
decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals in that same case, 
Hoover* & Bracken Energies, Inc., 52 I.B.L.A. 27 (1981). That case 
involved a federal oil and gas lease which had been communitized 
into a single drilling unit with a privately owned lease. The 
decision turned upon the notion that once communitized, the royalty 
attributable to the Department of the Interior lost its tax free 
status. . However, Hoover & Bracken applied Oklahoma law to the 
effect that communitized royalty interests form a single royalty 
interest. The rule in Utah is to the contrary. See Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954) (the legal 
nature of the royalty interest of each lessor in a federal unit is 
not changed by " unitization with private lands). In this case, 
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state leases are committed to federal units also containing federal 
and private leases as in Phillips Petroleum v. Peterson. 
Viewed conversely,, the majority opinion fails to consider, and 
in fact rejects, the notion that legal characteristics, such as tax 
exempt status associated with natural gas owned by the Division, 
must be considered in determining its value for royalty purposes. 
The majority finds it appropriate to compare the value of gas sold 
by a taxable entity with that owned by the Division. In this, the 
majorityfs decision is contrary to long-established legal 
principles. 
The general rule is that if natural gas attributable to a 
lessor under an oil and gas lease maintains different legal 
characteristics, that is a pricing category or sales arrangement 
that would affect the price for which it can be sold, those factors 
must be considered and are determinative of its royalty value. 
Bowers v. Phillips Petroleum Co.f 692 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Kinqrv v. Continental Oil • Co. , 626 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Domatti v. Exxon Corp., 494 F. Supp. 306 (W.D. La. 1980). Because 
the Division's natural gas is tax free, it must be valued as such, 
and its value cannot include tax reimbursements. The effect of 
Enron's position is not that Enron obtains for itself the benefit 
associated with the Division's tax free status. Enron's position 
simply means that it does not lose one-eighth (1/8) of the 
reimbursement for the taxes it paid because it produces gas from 
the Division's leases. Enron's position is entirely fair and 
consistent with the existing law on this issue. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RELIEF 
It is respectfully submitted that the majority opinion is 
premised upon legal principles that are incompatible with existing 
decisions of this Court and that of other courts. It is 
contradictory with the final decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
which addresses a directly related, if not identical issue. For 
that reason alone, this Decision should be reconsidered or at least 
clarified. The majority opinion requires that the Division and its 
lessees in effect calculate royalty twice, once based upon 
principles of Utah law and once upon the valuation regulations of 
the United States Department of the Interior, a result which must 
be reconsidered if only for practical reasons. Finally, the 
majority decision establishes Utah alone among every other 
jurisdiction in holding that the legal nature of a lessor's 
interest in natural gas need not be considered in determining its 
value for royalty purposes. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that 
the Court grant rehearing on this case and rule in favor of Enron 
reversing the decision of the District Court. 
Dated: February 2, 1994. 
Respectfully rsa^bmitted, 
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ADDENDUM 1 
This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Enron Oil and Gas Company, No. 910057 
Successor to Belco Petroleum F I L E D 
Corporation, January 5, 1994 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of State Lands Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
and Forestry, and the Director of 
State Lands, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., for State Lands and 
Forestry, State of Utah, amicus Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, Dep't of Natural Resources, Director of 
State Lands, and amicus Utah State Board of 
Education 
Steven F. Alder, Asst. Att'y Gen., for Dep't of 
Natural Resources, State Lands and Forestry, and 
State of Utah 
Gale K. Francis, Asst. Att'y Gen., for amicus Utah 
State Tax Comm'n 
J. Gary McCallister, Salt Lake City, for amicus Utah 
State Board of Education 
A. John Davis, III, Dante L. Zarlengo, Salt Lake 
City, for Enron Oil & Gas 
Phillip William Lear, Salt Lake City, for amicus ANR 
Production Co., amicus Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 
amicus CIG Exploration, Inc. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
Enron Oil and Gas Company produces and sells gas from 
school trust lands that it leases from the state. Enron appeals 
from a district court decision granting summary judgment to the 
Utah Department of Natural Resources, Division of State Lands. 
The summary judgment affirmed the Division's assessment of 
royalties on ad valorem tax reimbursements paid to Enron by 
tfoiinfcain Fuel Supply Co. and Colorado Interstate Gas (CIG) 
pursuant to gas purchase contracts for gas produced on state 
lands,*: We affirm. 
I. 
The Division of State Lands audited Enron's royalty 
payments on 52 oil and gas leases on school trust lands in Uintah 
County.1 Enron paid royalties to the State based on a price for 
gas that did not include ad valorem and severance tax 
reimbursements paid to Enron by Mountain Fuel and CIG. In 1987, 
the Division informed Enron that it owed $91,000 in royalty 
payments on the amount of the tax reimbursements. Enron appealed 
to the district court from a denial of a request for a 
redetermination of the royalty assessment. The district court 
held that the tax reimbursements were subject to royalty payments 
because they were part of the "market value" of the gas under the 
terms used in Enron's lease with the State. 
On this appeal, Enron argues that ad valorem tax 
reimbursements paid to it by gas purchasers cannot be considered 
in determining the "market value" of the gas, as that term is 
used in the leases. Enron also asserts that including tax 
reimbursements as part of the market value or price of gas 
conflicts with the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) of 1978, which 
sets the maximum lawful price for gas. 
Under the state leases,2 Enron agreed to pay the State 
a 12 1/2% royalty based on the "reasonable market value at the 
well of all gas produced and saved or sold from the leased 
1
 Enron owns 12 additional leases which were also subject to 
the Divisions audit, but because those leases contain different 
royalty provisions, our ruling pertains only to the 52 leases. 
2The leases were entered into pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 65-1-18, repealed by 1988 Utah Laws ch. 121, § 18, which 
provided: 
All mineral leases issued by the board shall 
contain such terms and provisions as the 
board deems to be in the best interest of the 
state and shall provide for such annual 
rental and for such royalty as the land board 
shall deem fair and in the best interest of 
the state of Utah, but the annual rental 
shall not be less than fifty cents per acre 
per annum nor more than one dollar per acre 
per annum and the royalty shall not exceed 
12 1/2% of the gross value of the product at 
the point of shipment from the leased 
premises. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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premises" and that "in no event shall the price for gas be less 
than that received by the United States of America for its 
royalties from gas of like grade and quality from the same 
field." In full, the lease royalty provision states: 
Gas—LESSEE also agrees to pay LESSOR twelve 
and one half per cent (12 1/2%) of the 
reasonable market value at the well of all 
gas produced and saved or sold from the 
leased premises. Where gas is sold under a 
contract, and such contract has been approved 
in whole or conditionally by the LESSOR, the 
reasonable market value of such gas for the 
purpose of determining the royalties payable 
hereunder shall be the price at which the 
production is sold, provided that in no event 
shall the price for gas be less than that 
received by the United States of America for 
its royalties from gas of like grade and 
guality from the same field. 
(Emphasis added.) 
During the audit period, Enron sold gas it produced 
from the Chapita Wells Unit Area to Mountain Fuel. Under the gas 
purchase agreement, Mountain Fuel agreed to pay Enron a price for 
its gas computed pursuant to the following provision: 
The price of any gas whose maximum base price 
is regulated by the FERC or by a properly 
constituted state authority at the time of 
delivery ("regulated gas") shall be the 
highest applicable base price, including all 
applicable escalations, on the date the gas 
is delivered. . . . The total price for 
regulated gas shall consist of the base 
price, reimbursements of costs borne by the 
Seller for which reimbursement by Buyer is 
permitted under the applicable statutes and 
regulations, and tax reimbursements made 
pursuant to Section VII-3. 
(Emphasis added.) Under this contract it is clear that the 
"total price" paid Enron included the "base price" and "tax 
reimbursements." 
Enron sold gas produced from the Natural Buttes Unit 
Area to CIG at a price to be computed pursuant to the following 
provision in the gas purchase contract: 
Subparagraph (c) of Paragraph 5.1 of 
ARTICLE V - PRICE shall be amended by adding 
thereto the following: 
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Such rate paid pursuant to this 
paragraph shall include the highest prices 
allowed by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) under Section 107(c)(5) of 
the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA) for 
gas delivered to Buyer by Seller from 
formations that qualify for such prices. 
Such rate shall change to conform to all such 
adjustments and escalations and any revisions 
on the date they become effective as to the 
sale of gas covered hereby. 
(Emphasis added.) This provision makes clear that the price paid 
Enron included "the highest prices allowed by the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission." 
II. 
The price of natural gas is regulated by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) (previously the Federal Power 
Commission), which sets the maximum price producers may charge 
for gas. Historically, gas producers sought to increase the 
amount they received for gas by requiring purchasers to pay, in 
addition to the stated price, an amount equal to the ad valorem 
and severance taxes that the producers paid to the state. Gas 
purchasers paid the amount of the taxes even though it was in 
addition to the maximum price permitted by the FERC. Thus, gas 
purchasers, although not legally liable for the taxes, paid more 
than the maximum price allowed, under the guise of assuming one 
of the producer/s costs of production. As a result, the so-
called tax reimbursements increased the price that the producers 
received for the gas. 
There is a long-standing practice of gas producers 
requiring gas purchasers to pay tax reimbursements. See, e.g., 
Amoco Prod. Co., 29 I.B.L.A. 234 (1977); Wheless Drilling Co., 13 
I.B.L.A. 21 (1973). In fact, the NGPA specifically allowed tax 
reimbursements to be added to the maximum price fixed: 
(a) . . . a price for the first sale of 
natural gas shall not be considered to exceed 
the maximum lawful price applicable to the 
first sale of such natural gas . . . if such 
first sale price exceeds the maximum lawful 
price to the extent necessary to recover. 
(1) State severance taxes attributable 
to the production of such natural gas 
and borne by the seller. . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 3320(a) (1982), repealed by 103 Stat. 158 (effective 
Jan. 1, 1993). 
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Whether Enron was obligated to pay a royalty on the tax 
reimbursement payments depends on whether the payments are part 
of the "reasonable market value" of the gas sold by Enron as that 
term is used in the state leases. The leases define "reasonable 
market value" as the price for which the gas is sold but not less 
than the price received by the United States. 
Enron concedes that the market value of gas is the 
highest price that a willing buyer would agree to pay a willing 
seller* The stated price is not, however, the sole measure of 
market value in this case. Severance taxes are a cost of 
production for the producer. Shifting that cost to the buyer by 
a tax reimbursement is simply additional consideration to the 
seller. In short, the stated price plus tax reimbursements 
constitute the consideration that a willing buyer pays a willing 
seller and together they equal the "reasonable market value" of 
the gas. In Enron Oil & Gas v. Luianf 778 F. Supp. 348, 352 
(S.D. Tex. 1991), aff'd, Enron Oil & Gas co. v. Luian, 978 F.2d 
212 (5th Cir. 1992), the court stated, "[R]oyalty is assessed on 
value of production as reflected by the market. In the 
marketplace, Enron is able to sell its gas for a maximum legal 
price plus reimbursement of the severance tax," (Emphasis 
added.) 
If Enron had agreed to sell the gas solely for the NGPA 
price, Enron would have paid the state severance taxes, thereby 
reducing its net proceeds from the sale. Because the buyers were 
willing to pay a price higher than the stated price by the amount 
of the severance taxes imposed on the seller, the true market 
price or value received by Enron was the stated price plus tax 
reimbursements. See Enron Corp., 106 I.B.L.A. 394, 397 (1989). 
To rule otherwise would allow Enron to "determine the value of 
production simply by allocating the value they will receive under 
different categories designated as being other than the xprice,, 
yet all relating to the production." Amoco Prod. Co. , 29 
I.B.L.A. 234, 237-38 n.2 (1977). 
The "reasonable market value" or "price at which the 
production is sold" under Enron7s lease is explicitly stated in 
the Mountain Fuel contract: "The total price for regulated gas 
shall consist of the base price . . . and tax reimbursements." 
The language in the CIG gas purchase contract is not as clear 
with respect to specifying consideration to be paid Enron, but it 
is nevertheless clear that the total consideration is the stated 
price plus the tax reimbursement. That agreement refers to the 
"highest prices allowed by Federal Energy Regulation Commission." 
Enron's position is especially untenable in view of the 
lease language providing that "in no event shall the price for 
gas be less than that received by the United States of America 
for its royalties from gas of like grade and quality from the 
same field." This provision places a floor on the price of gas 
for royalty calculations and ensures that the leases are "in the 
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best interest of the state," as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 65-1-18 and the terms of the state school land trust. The 
price of gas for determining federal royalties has consistently 
been held to include tax reimbursements. E.g. Enron Oil & Gas 
Co. v. Luianr 978 F.2d 212, 216 (5th Cir. 1992); Hoover & Bracken 
Energies, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 723 F.2d 1488, 
1492 (10th Cir. 1983); Amoco Prod. Co., 29 I.B.L.A. 234, 238 
(1977); Wheless Drilling Co., 13 I.B.L.A. 21, 32 (1973). "If the 
market value or amount realized is higher than the federal floor, 
royalties must be paid on the basis of market value or amount 
realized. Conversely, if the . . . market value is lower than 
the federal floor, royalties must be paid on the basis of the 
federal floor." State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d 470, 474 (Wyo. 
198 6). If Enron were to sell gas based at a price less than the 
floor provision when the reasonable market value would yield a 
higher price, the Division could reject such a contract. See 
Moncrief, 720 P.2d at 474-75. 
Enron argues that including the tax reimbursements for 
royalty purposes unjustly enriches the State because state school 
section gas is not subject to ad valorem taxes and if the State 
were to take its gas in kind, it could receive only the NGPA 
price without the tax reimbursement. The argument is without 
merit for two reasons. First, it assumes that the only value to 
the State of gas in-kind is what the State could sell the gas 
for. That is not so. "If . . . the Government were to take its 
royalty interest in kind, the implicit assumption would be that 
it [has] a use for the gas. The value of fthe] gas is, 
therefore, properly computed as the price which the rState] would 
pay on the open market if it were purchasing the gas as an 
ordinary purchaser." Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc., 52 
I.B.L.A. 27, 37 (1981) (emphasis added). 
Second, Enron,s argument seeks to capture for itself 
the benefit of the tax immunity that the State enjoys. A similar 
argument based on federal immunity to state taxation was rejected 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 
That court held that the benefit of the federal government's 
immunity from state taxation flows to the federal government, not 
to lessees of federal lands: 
"The fact that the United States cannot 
be assessed state severance tax does not 
depreciate the value of the gas to it. 
Immunity from state taxation is a function of 
the Federal Government's sovereignty, which 
prevents the state from assessing a severance 
tax. This benefit flows to the Government, 
not the lessor." 
Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc. v. United States Dep't of 
Interior, 723 F.2d 1488, 1491 (10th Cir. 1983) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc., 52 I.B.L.A. 
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27, 37 (1981)). Clearly the State, not Enron, is entitled to the 
benefit of the immunity of state lands from taxation. 
The argument is made by the dissent that Enron receives 
the tax reimbursements in return for its commitment to a long-
term contract, not as consideration for the gas itself. There 
is, however, no practical difference between consideration for 
the gas and consideration for a commitment to a long-term 
contract. Gas is typically sold pursuant to long-term contracts. 
In any event, the distinction the dissent draws is not in accord 
with economic realities. Severance taxes are a seller,s cost of 
production, and when such a cost is paid for by a buyer, the 
value of the gas is increased accordingly. See Amoco Prod. Co., 
29 I.B.L.A. 234, 237-38 n.2 (1977). 
Finally, Enron claims that assessing royalties on the 
tax reimbursements violated the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. 
This argument has been rejected by the federal courts and is 
without merit. E.g., Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Luian, 978 F.2d 212, 
216 (5th Cir. 1992); Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc. v. United 
States Dep't of Interior, 723 F.2d 1488, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 
1983) . 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
DURHAM, Justice, dissenting: 
Two of Enron's leases are at issue in this appeal, one 
entered into on January 2, 1953, by Continental Oil Co. (Enron's 
predecessor in interest) and the State Land Board, and the second 
entered into on April 10, 1964, by Midwest Oil Corporation (also 
a predecessor in interest) and the State Land Board. Both leases 
establish that Enron must pay 12 1/2% of the "reasonable market 
value" at the well of all gas produced and saved or sold from the 
leased premises. The leases define reasonable market value as 
the "price at which the production is sold" in a contract either 
approved or conditionally approved by the lessor. 
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Enron and the Division differ on the proper meaning of 
the language "price at which the production is sold," The 
Division refers to section 65-1-18 of the Utah Code: 
All mineral leases issued by the board shall 
contain such terms and provisions as the 
board deems to be in the best interest of the 
state and shall provide for such annual 
rental and for such royalty as the land board 
shall deem fair and in the best interest of 
the state of Utah, but the annual rental 
shall not be less than fifty cents per acre 
per annum nor more than one dollar per acre 
per annum and the royalty shall not exceed 
12 1/2% of the gross value of the product at 
the point of shipment from the leased 
premises. 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18 (Supp. 1967) (repealed 1988) (emphasis 
added).1 The Division contends that for royalty purposes, price 
is equivalent to "the gross value of the product at the point of 
shipment." Gross value, as defined by the federal courts and the 
oil and gas industry in general, includes tax reimbursements. 
See, e.g.f Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Luian, 978 F.2d 212, 215 (5th 
Cir. 1992); Hoover & Bracken Energies, Inc. v. DPI, 723 F.2d 
1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); 
Wheless Drilling Co., 13 I.B.L.A. 21, 30-31 (1973). The majority 
has essentially adopted the Division/s broad definition of gross 
value, a definition derived from section 65-1-18, into the lease 
language. 
The words used by the parties to these lease 
agreements, not the language of section 65-1-18, are the primary 
indication of the content of their promises. In issuing or 
renewing these leases, the Division could easily have used the 
exact language now found in section 65-1-18 to describe the 
royalty assessment, but it did not. The court,s function is to 
give the lease language its ordinary meaning, not to read 
statutory material into it. Furthermore, the Division could have 
used a royalty provision similar to that used in the section 
dealing with royalty payments for oil, section 4(a) of the lease. 
Section 4(a) states in relevant part: 
*The text of section 65-1-18 relied on by both parties, the 
majority, and this dissent was not adopted until 1967. Compare 
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18 (1953) with Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18 
(Supp. 1967). As the parties are unconcerned with the 
discrepancy and both leases have since been renewed under the 
current text of section 65-1-18, I note the distinction purely 
for informational purposes. 
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When paid in money, the royalty shall be 
calculated upon the reasonable market value 
of the oil at the well, including any subsidy 
or extra payment which the lessees, or any 
successor in interest thereto, may receive, 
without regard as to whether such subsidy or 
extra payment shall be made in the nature of 
money or other consideration . . . . 
The fact that the lease specifically makes provision for any 
"subsidy or extra payment" which may be received by the lessee in 
exchange for oil production implies that subsidies and extra 
payments were contemplated in the preparation of the lease and 
that the parties chose to include them in the royalty provisions 
for oil, but not for natural gas. 
Finally, the majority, by adopting the Division's 
argument, misinterprets the significance of section 65-1-18 with 
respect to the computation of royalties. Section 65-1-18 exists 
to create a cap on the royalty amounts. Under the statute, 
royalties may not "exceed 12 1/2% of the gross value of the 
product at the point of shipment from the leased premises." Utah 
Code Ann. § 65-1-18 (emphasis added). This statute does not 
establish "gross value" as the basis for calculating royalties. 
In fact, as long as the royalty does not exceed 12 1/2% of the 
gross value of the gas from the point of shipment, section 65-1-
18 is not relevant to the task of determining the value of the 
state's royalty share. 
THE GAS PURCHASE AGREEMENTS 
The most compelling indication that the "price at which 
the production is sold" does not mean what the majority claims is 
found in the gas purchase agreements Enron entered into with 
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. ("CIG") and Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
("Mountain Fuel"). These agreements established the price at 
which Enron sold the gas. Article V, section 5.1 of the Enron-
CIG agreement contained the original price provision. 
Provisions (A) and (C) established that after 1982, all gas 
purchased by CIG would be bought at the national ceiling price 
provided by the Federal Power Commission ("FPC") (now the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission or "FERC"). However, in an 
amendment to the gas purchase agreement dated May 21, 1981, the 
parties agreed to increase the rate prior to 1982. The amendment 
stated that the rate would include 
the highest prices allowed by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) under 
Section 107(c)(5) of the Natural Gas Policy 
Act of 1978 (NGPA) for gas delivered to Buyer 
by Seller from formations that qualify for 
such prices. Such rate shall change to 
conform to all such adjustments and 
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escalations and any revisions on the date 
they become effective as to the sale of gas 
covered hereby. 
The provisions for "price" in the original gas purchase agreement 
and each of its amendments make no reference to tax 
reimbursements. 
Under the Enron-CIG agreement, the payment of tax 
reimbursements is governed by article V of exhibit A, entitled 
"General Conditions Gas Purchase Agreement," This provision is 
not included in the article dealing with pricey nor is it 
considered ^n element Ot the pric^ According to the gas 
purchase agreement, the tax reimbursement, while a part of the 
total value of the contract, is not part of the value of the gas 
itself. See Belnorth Petrol, Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266, 
270 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("The fact that a natural gas purchaser 
is willing to absorb the ad valorem tax liability of the seller 
in addition to the value it pays for the gas itself, does not 
increase the value of the gas." (emphasis in original)).2 
The Enron-Mountain Fuel gas purchase agreement, though 
not as clear as the CIG agreement, compels the same conclusion. 
Article Vll-l(a) of the Mountain Fuel agreement sets the price of 
gas purchased under the agreement: "The price of any gas whose 
maximum base price is regulated by the FERC or by a properly 
constituted state authority at the time of delivery ("regulated 
gas") shall be the highest applicable base price, including all 
applicable escalations, on the date the gas is delivered." 
Article I, section 15 of the agreement defines base price as "the 
wellhead price per MMBTU [million British thermal units] of gas, 
exclusive of any adjustments for taxes and production-related 
costs such as compression, gathering, processing, treating or 
other similar costs." However, the majority has identified the 
base price as the "price at which the production is sold" for 
royalty purposes. It has concluded that we must use "total 
price" as defined in section Vll-l(a) of the Mountain Fuel 
agreement as the basis for calculating Enron's royalty payments, 
i.e., total price includes base price, plus cost and tax 
reimbursements allowed by statute and made pursuant to the 
agreement. 
I agree with Enron that the "price at which the 
production is sold" under both gas purchase agreements is the 
base price, excluding tax reimbursements. The majority 
incorrectly assumes that all value given by the buyer in the gas 
purchase agreement is exchanged for a unit of production. I 
disagree. The tax reimbursement provisions are properly viewed 
as a separate part of the contract, distinct from the price 
2Belnorth Petroleum Corporation is the predecessor in 
interest to Enron. 
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terms. Although I recognize that the tax reimbursements are a 
part of the total economic value associated with the purchase 
agreements, I believe that they should not be viewed as having 
been given in exchange for the gas itself. 
In the natural gas industry, producers typically enter 
into long-term contracts with buyers. A buyer is usually a 
transmission company which must extend its pipelines to the 
source of supply- This capital outlay may be justified only if 
the transmission company is assured a long-term supply of gas. 
Sellers, however, are unwilling to commit to long-term contracts 
with fixed prices given that future tax increases could turn a 
profitable contract into a poor deal- Therefore, the buyer is 
willing to give value for a long-term contract. The buyer 
usually bears the costs of ad valorem taxes (severance taxes) and 
the risk of future tax increases during the life of the contract. 
See Belnorth, 845 P-2d at 270. Thus, Enron receives tax 
reimbursements in return for its commitment to a long-term 
contract, not as consideration for the gas itself. Cf. Diamond 
Shamrock Exploration Corp. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 
1988) (payments made pursuant to "take-or-pay" provisions do not 
represent part of the value of the gas); see also Earl A. Brown, 
The Law of Oil and Gas Leases, § 6.09(1) (A) (2d ed. 1984). 
I would hold that for royalty purposes, the reasonable 
market value of the gas produced and saved or sold by Enron is 
determined by the unit price, exclusive of tax reimbursements, at 
which the production is sold under the gas purchase agreements 
entered into with CIG and Mountain Fuel. 
THE "FEDERAL FLOOR" LEASE PROVISION 
Notwithstanding the foregoing determination of the 
correct method for calculating reasonable market value, I also 
address the Division's argument concerning the "federal floor" 
royalty provision contained in the lease agreements. The Land 
Board's lease agreements contain the following clause: 
Gas—LESSEE also agrees to pay to LESSOR 
twelve and one half per cent (12 1/2%) of the 
reasonable market value at the well of all 
gas produced and saved or sold from the 
leased premises. Where gas is sold under a 
contract, and such contract has been approved 
in whole or conditionally by the LESSOR, the 
reasonable market value of such gas for the 
purpose of determining the royalties payable 
hereunder shall be the price at which the 
production is sold, provided that in no event 
shall the price for gas be less than that 
received by the United States of America for 
its royalties from gas of like grade and 
guality from the same field. 
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(Emphasis added.) In its brief, the Division characterized this 
provision as requiring that "the price for gas used to determine 
the royalty shall not be less than the price used to determine 
the royalties xreceived by the United States of America for its 
royalties from gas of like grade and quality from the same 
field.'" I am in complete agreement with this reading of the 
lease language. The majority, however, goes further, concluding 
that this provision requires that the state receive at least as 
much as the federal government receives in £r>yalties. I cannot 
accept this interpretation. 
United States lease royalties are based on more than 
just the* unit price of production. In Hoover & Bracken Energies, 
Inc. v. United States Department of Interior, 723 F.2d 1488, 1492 
(10th Cir. 1983), the Tenth Circuit posed this question: "What 
is the value of production? Is it contract price, or contract 
price, plus severance? The latter is the value of production for 
payment of royalties." In Wheless Drilling Co., 13 I.B.L.A. 21 
(1973), the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA") came to the 
conclusion that tax reimbursements were, in fact, given as 
consideration for natural gas production: 
It seems obvious to us that the buyer thus is 
paying to the seller an amount greater than 
the established field price for the natural 
gas it purchases from the #1 T.L. James well. 
It follows, therefore, that it is reasonable 
to compute the Federal royalty of the natural 
gas taken from this well on a unit value 
consisting of the field price established by 
FPC plus the amount of the severance tax 
reimbursed by the buyer. 
13 I.B.L.A. at 30. Since Wheless, federal courts addressing this 
issue have taken the position that tax reimbursements are given 
as consideration for the gas itself and, as such, must be 
included in the computation of the United States' royalty share. 
Enron Oil & Gas Co. v. Luian, 978 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1992); 
Hoover, 723 F.2d at 1490. 
However, in Wheless, Hoover, and other federal cases 
cited by the Division and the majority, the IBLA and federal 
courts were interpreting 30 C.F.R. § 221.47, which states: 
The value of production, for the purpose of 
computing royalty shall be the estimated 
reasonable value of the product as determined 
by the supervisor, due consideration being 
given to the highest price paid for a part or 
for a majority of production of like quality 
in the same field, to the price received by 
the lessee, to posted prices and to other 
relevant matters. Under no circumstances 
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shall the value of production of any of said 
substances for the purposes of computinO-
rovaltv be deemed to be less than the gross 
•proceeds accruing to the lessee from the sale 
thereof or less than the value computed on 
such reasonable unit value as shall have been 
determined by the Secretary. 
(Emphasis added.) Wheless, for example, focused on the 
interpretation of the term "gross proceeds" as contained in 3 0 
C.F.R. § 221.47. Wheless established that for purposes of 
federal royalties, gross proceeds include "the established field 
price for the natural gas plus any additional sums paid by the 
purchaser of the gas to the unit operator as consideration for 
the purchase of gas from the unit of which the federal lease is a 
part." 13 I.B.L.A. at 30-31.3 
In the case at hand, 30 C.F.R. § 221.47 has no 
application. As I mentioned previously, section 65-1-18 does not 
require that the state's royalty be based on "gross value" or 
"gross proceeds," as does the federal statute. The state's 
royalty, as established by the leases in question, is based on 
the "reasonable market value," as indicated by the price of the 
gas sold under a contract. Moreover, our standard of review is 
entirely different from that employed by the federal courts. In 
Wheless, the IBLA was construing its own regulations. 13 
I.B.L.A. at 30-31. In Hoover, the court deferred to the IBLA's 
interpretation of its own regulations. 723 F.2d at 1489-90. We 
are not xequired to^  ga^ ant deference to the Division. Rather, we 
may decide for ourselves the proper basis for the state's royalty 
share. The federal cases relied on by the Division and the 
majority are thus entirely distinguishable and not, in my view, 
persuasive. 
Furthermore, as Enron points out in its brief, both the 
Chapita Wells and the Natural Buttes Units consist predominantly 
of oil and gas leases issued by the United States. The gas 
produced from these United States leases is sold under the same 
gas purchase agreements as the gas sold from the wells on state 
land. Both CIG and Mountain Fuel pay exactly the same rate for 
gas from state and federal lands. Enron's lease agreement with 
the state merely stipulates that the price received for 
production under approved natural gas purchase agreements shall 
not be less than the price received for production on federal 
leases. It certainly does not require that all elements of 
3Even if Utah royalties were based upon "gross value," we 
would not necessarily include tax reimbursements in the 
calculation, because, as observed earlier, tax reimbursements are 
not necessarily given as consideration for the natural gas 
itself, but for other economic value associated with the 
contract. 
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royalty valuation be the same for state leases as for federal 
leases. Therefore, I would hold that Enron is in compliance with 
the "fed€>ral floor" provision of its lease because the prices for 
gas sold from state and federal lands in the Chapita Wells Unit 
Area and the Natural Buttes Unit Area are identical. 
Zimmerman, Chief Justice, concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Durham. 
Hall, Justice, acted on this case prior to his 
retirement. 
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